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"Buy land. They 're not making it anymore.
Mark Twain

"The mortgage black hole is, I think, worse than anyone saw. Deeper,
darker,scarier."

Tony James, President & CEO, Blackstone International
I. INTRODUCTION

The nation's subprime housing market, once a $650 billion dollar
behemoth comprising a whopping quarter of the entire mortgage market,'
has experienced a dramatic freefall over the past eighteen months caused
in part by rising interest rates, an inverted yield curve, and, most
significantly, a precipitous drop in home prices.2 As defaults continue to
pile up, more and more people are being foreclosed from their homes while
investors in mortgage backed securities are losing more and more value.3
Over the late 1990s and early 2000s, more Americans than ever were
fulfilling part of the American Dream: owning their own home.4 Subprime
lending5 revolutionized the residential mortgage market by allowing
individuals with poor credit, who would normally be unable to take out a
home mortgage, the opportunity to create wealth through the purchase of
real estate. 6 Once the market started to plummet,7 federal and state

1. See Heather H. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124
BANKING L.J. 407, 407 (2007).

2. See Robert S. Friedman & Eric R. Wilson, The LegalFalloutFrom the Subprime Crisis,
124 BANKING L.J. 420, 420 (2007).
3. See Tashman, supra note 1, at 416-17.
4. See, e.g., David Anderson, The Subprime Lending Crisis, 71 TEx. B.J. 20, 20 (2008);
Tashman, supra note 1, at 407; Tania Davenport, Note, An American Nightmare: Predatory
Lending in the Subprime Home MortgageIndustry, 36 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 531, 536-45 (2003).
5. "'Subprime lending' refers to the practice of making loans to borrowers who do not meet
traditional credit underwriting standards." LEXISNEXIS, BACKGROUNDER ON SUBPRIME LENDING
(2007); see also Ann Graham, Where Agencies, the Courts,andthe LegislatureCollide: Ten Years
9 TEX. TECH.ADMIN.
ofInterpretingthe Texas ConstitutionalProvisionsforHomeEquityLending,
L.J. 69, 110 (2007) ("Subprime lending refers to extending loans to borrowers with substandard
credit records. Because of higher risk, subprime loans carry a commensurately higher interest rate
and a higher default rate. Subprime lending is not necessarily predatory lending, a term which
describes abusive practices, but it can be.").
6. Tashman, supra note 1, at 1407-08. Two University of Chicago economists conducted
a study regarding the effects of securitization on the availability of credit. The results were striking.
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governments began scrutinizing subprime lending practices finding
predatory lending, high rates of bankruptcy for subprime mortgage
companies, and threats of suit against securitizers and assignees of
subprime mortgage backed securities. 8
This Note studies the most significant 9 Congressional response to the
subprime mortgage crisis by analyzing and critiquing House Bill 3915, The
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007.1°
Part II of this Note lays a foundation for the subprime industry by
outlining a "typical" subprime mortgage transaction. Part IHgives a brief
summary of House Bill 3915 grouping its regulatory highlights into three
key classifications: (1) federal and state agency response; (2) regulations
directed at mortgage brokers and originators and the loan vehicles they
market; and (3) the creation of secondary market participant liability. An
analysis of which serves as the body of the Note.
In Part IV, the federal and state agency response is examined and
particular consideration is given to the flexibility and reactivity of the
response. Part V analyzes and argues in favor of the creation of the federal
duty of care for mortgage originators and the new suitability provisions for
home loans and critiques the per se prohibitions within the new minimum
mortgage standards. Part VI discusses the creation of the new assignee
liability provisions and evaluates whether House Bill 3915 will provide
any net positive change over a significant period of time. Finally, Part VII
presents a forward thinking conclusion advocating flexibility, reactivity,
and proper risk allocation. The concluding section also points out key areas
that House Bill 3915 completely ignores, in particular its silence as to
credit rating agency behavior.
Though a detailed analysis is outside the scope of this Note, the economists concluded that there
was a disproportionately large increase in the rate of approved mortgages during securitization's
heyday of 2001-2005. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit
Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis, Jan. 1, 2008, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=-1072304.
7. Alton Gary Simpson colorfully describes the upcoming year as like "waking up in a
fraternity house the day after a wild party. You've got a hangover; you're not really certain about
how you got here or who that is in bed next to you; the house is in ruins; and the cops are knocking
at the front door." Alton Gary Simpson, The HangoverSets in as OriginatorsLook to the Horizon
for Answers, BROKER MAG., Dec. 1, 2007, at 30.
8. Id.
9. I believe that H.R. 3915 is the most significant piece of legislation to date regarding the
subprime housing crisis. It is the only bill that has passed either house of Congress. Though it is
still awaiting consideration in the Senate, its strong bipartisan support in the House indicates that
it may have a reasonable chance of success if in a slightly modified form.
10. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. §
1(a) (2007).
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SUBPRIME TRANSACTION

The "typical" subprime transaction is not a simple case of borrower and
lender." In a typical subprime transaction there are twelve (or more)
crucial players: "a borrower, a broker, an originator, a seller, an
underwriter, a trust, a trustee, multiple servicers, a document custodian,.
. . an external credit enhancer, a securities placement agent, and
investors."' 12 Due to the complexity of the market, there is no such thing as
a "typical" subprime securitization transaction.' 3 There are myriad ways
that originators adapt loan features to balance risk or market loans to
borrowers based on risk-based pricing in the subprime marketplace. 14With
this limitation in mind, this section attempts to outline a "typical" subprime
transaction.
At the bottom of the transaction is the subprime borrower. 5 A true
subprime borrower (as opposed to those people who qualify for prime
loans but are steered into subprime loans) 16 is one who cannot qualify for
a traditional mortgage loan because of a high probability of default
compared to borrowers with better credit history.' 7 Mortgage lending
companies usually grade borrowers by analyzing debt-to-income ratio,
credit history, FICO score, and other additional measures of credit
worthiness.' 8 Because subprime borrowers are estimated to be more likely
than prime borrowers to default on their loans, it is riskier for loan

11. See Christopher Peterson, PredatoryStructuredFinance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.2185,
2256 (2007) (comparing the early American mortgage system with the current system of securitized
subprime mortgage backed securities).
12. Id.
13. See Tashman, supra note 1, at 409 ("The subprime industry, however, has introduced
many different pricing tiers and products to move the market toward risk-based pricing"). See also
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price,65 MD.L. REV. 707, 727 (2006). "[S]ubprime loan pricing is too complicated and
variable to advertise prices."
14. See Willis, supra note 13, at 727.
15. See id. "Obtaining a home loan is the most significant, complex, and long-term economic
transaction in which many Americans will ever engage." Id.at 711.
16. See id. at 730 ("It is estimated that as many as half of the borrowers with subprime loans
were qualified for lower prime interest rate loans, based on their credit history and loan profile.").
17. See Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A PrimerJune 21,
2007, 15783 PRAc. L. INST. 89,92 (2007); Dale Ledbetter, Understandingthe Sub-PrimeDebacle,
15783 PRAC. L. INST. 35, 39 (2007).
18. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 92. In particular, Fair Isaac Company's
assessment of a consumer's credit score, or FICO score is relevant. Id.Scores range between 300
and 850; anything below 620 is generally considered subprime. Id.

2008]

MORTGAGE REFORMAND ANTI-PREDATORYLENDING ACT OF 2007: A SUBOPTIMAL RESPONSE

501

originators to extend the credit needed for such a large purchase.' 9 To make
up for the inherent risk, lenders generally charge higher interest rates than
on prime mortgages and include exotic loan features designed to
compensate originators in case of certain events. 20 Though it is
occasionally true that prospective subprime borrowers actively solicit loan
offers, more often lending institutions aggressively market residential loans
and cash-out-refinancings to consumers.2 '
Mortgage brokers originate about two-thirds of subprime mortgages.22
A broker may identify a potential subprime borrower "through a variety of
marketing approaches including direct mail, telemarketing, door-to-door
solicitation, and television or radio advertising., 23 Because brokers are paid
by commission, it is in their financial self-interest to sell as many loans as
possible, a practice known as churning.24 Solicitation may, at times, be
very aggressive. In addition to marketing loans, brokers assess borrower
credit-worthiness and assist loan originators in recommending a particular
vehicle to the borrower.2 6 Once a consumer agrees to begin the lending
process, the broker submits a formal loan application 27 on behalf of the
borrower to loan originators who fund approved loans. 28 If the loan
application is accepted, the borrower, broker, and originator close on the

19.
20.
21.
subprime

See id.
See generally DEP'T. OF THE TREAS. ET AL., STATEMENT ON SUBPRIME LENDING (2007).
See Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208. As it stands, "[o]nly between 10% and 20% of
loans are used for home purchases. Instead, most subprime loans are home equity loans

or cash out refinancings ....Because subprime lenders require more equity to secure the loan,

subprime loans are less likely to be used for home purchases." Willis, supra note 13, at 723.
22. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 95.
23. Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208. While the fact that brokers often advertise to seek out
borrowers may at first come across as a good thing for consumers, that is not necessarily the case.
Willis argues that because of the advent of risk-based pricing, brokers do not advertise generic
prices. See Willis, supra note 13, at 727-28. Subprime loans are simply too complicated to allow
consumers to price shop. See id.
24. See generally DEP'T. OF THE TREAS. ET AL., supra note 20.
25. See supra text accompanying note 23.
26. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 95. "In determining the interest rate and
other pricing variables, the broker and the originator rely on one or more consumer credit reporting
agencies that compile databases of information .... Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208.
27. During the application process, brokers may encourage applicants to submit false
information about their ability to repay the loan, especially income. See Celeste M. Hammond,
Predatory Lending-A Legal Definition and Update, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 176, 179 (2005). In
addition, submitting a formal loan application may mean paying the broker a nonrefundable
application fee.
28. See Peterson, supranote 11, at 2208. There are some brokers who fund loans themselves
using their own personal funds or lines of credit. However, most brokers act simply as agents for
originators. Id.at 2208-09.
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loan, whereon the borrower signs binding loan statements.29 After closing,
the loan originator records the loan at a county recording office, publicly
establishing its right to payment. 30 By this point, the broker has fulfilled all
of the broker's obligations to both borrower and originator and moves on
to the next prospective customer.3
Typically, the loan originator then sells the loan to a subsidiary of a
large investment bank that transfers this loan along with others into a large
pool of loans.3 Once pooled together, the investment bank sells the loans
to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), usually a trust, created for the express
purpose of this transaction.33 Investment banks create SPVs to market the
The banks sell shares known as mortgage
pool of loans to investors.
34
(MBS).
securities
backed
Generally, an underwriter purchases all of the shares of the trust (as
MBS). 35 The underwriter then uses placement agents working on
commission to sell the securities to investors. 36 Although individuals can
and do buy MBS, the primary investors in MBS are large institutional
investors such as pension funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds.3 7
As almost all securitized assets are rated for investment, credit rating
agencies like Moody's and Standard & Poor's play a crucial role by

29. Id. at 2208.
30. Id. at 2209.
31. See id. at 2208-09.
32. See id. at 2209; but cf Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 95-96 (explaining that
loan originators themselves often create trusts or new corporations and sell the rights directly to
their own trusts before selling the entire entity to investment banks and other underwriters). It must
also be noted at this point that the vast majority of subprime loans on the market are eventually
securitized. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turninga BlindEye: Wall Street Finance
of PredatoryLending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2040 (2007).
33. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 95-96. "The trust structure is used because it is
exempt from taxes, allows the originator to treat the transaction as a loan sale, and insulates
investors from the liabilities of the originator and issuer." Id. at 96. Though the tax consequences
of securitization is outside the scope of this Note, it is an extremely important and interesting
subject that is sure to come under scrutiny over the course of the next several years. For a detailed
discussion of the tax consequences of securitization and a new proposal, see Thomas A.
Humphreys, The Way (Securitization)Things Ought To Be, 11569 PRAC. L. INST. 1041 (2007).
34. See Peterson, supranote 11, at 2209.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S.
Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 77, 92 (2008) (arguing that one of the chief problems of
securitization is that the large institutional investors operate almost entirely without regulation); see
also Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 97.
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assessing the level of risk for each MBS. 38 Subprime MBS require the
addition of certain credit enhancements to qualify as investment-grade
securities because the securitized assets can expose potential investors to
a substantial amount of risk.39 Using a process known as credit tranching,
the underwriter divides the MBS into classes based on the estimated level
of risk.4 °
The top level tranches (triple A or double A) are those deemed to be the
least risky.4 ' Triple A and Double A tranches are classified as "senior" to
riskier classes, which means that investors in top tranche MBS will be paid
out before investors who buy from lower rated tranches.42 Consequently,
investors who purchase the riskiest tranche (generally not rated) are paid
out last.43
For this reason, investment banks find it difficult to sell the unrated
tranches of MBS to outside investors. As a result, the banks will often
retain the rights to those classes themselves." By classifying and rating
each tranche of MBS, credit rating agencies "obviate the need for each
individual investor to do due diligence on the underlying mortgages in the
pool. '45 Thus, investors often have little or no idea about the nature of the
individual loans within the MBS.
In essence, investors are buying the rights to the income streams
generated by the mortgages: that is, the loan payments of interest and

38. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supranote 17, at 96. Because "[i]nvestment banks and other
private enterprises currently shape the structure and rules of these instruments," credit rating
agencies are the only entities that currently monitor the nature of MBS by assigning risk and credit
tranching. See Unterman, supra note 37, at 81. However, since credit rating agencies are profit
driven companies, there is no real regulation of the MBS market. See id. at 81-82. Unterman argues
extensively about the dangers inherent in securitization of debt. See, e.g., id.
39. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supranote 17, at 96. Credit enhancements include bank letters
of credit, bond insurance, and the senior and subordinate credit tranching process. See id.
40. See id. See also Peterson, supra note 11, at 2210.
"[M]ortgage risk" focuses above all upon borrower net equity over time-which
is to say, the risk that foreclosure on a defaulting mortgage will not recoup
invested funds. Evaluation of "pool risk" looks at factors such as the size of the
loan pool and the geographic diversity of underlying mortgages.
Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 96.
See id.
See id.
See Peterson, supra note 11, at 2210.
Id. at2210.
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principal made by the borrower.46 It is the role of the mortgage servicer, an
independent entity not otherwise associated with investors, to collect the
loan payments.47 For a designated fee, the servicer will remit the payments
to the mortgage originator for distribution to investors.48
In 2006 and 2007, after years of rapid growth, the subprime market
crashed.4 9 Housing prices across the country dropped precipitously just as
rates on subprime mortgages were due to adjust upward.5 ° Borrowers
began defaulting on loan payments at a rate far exceeding the expectations
of originators, investment banks, credit rating agencies, and investors.5 '
Subprime loans turned out to be far riskier than anyone expected. The
defaults radically diminished the value of investors' MBS, even at the
Triple A and Double A tranche levels.52 "By October, foreclosures were up
ninety-four percent from the year before, and Wall Street firms such as
Citigroup and Merrill Lynch were forced to write down tens of billions of
dollars in subprime assets on their books."53 The effects of the housing
market collapse have been widespread, and,54 as of this writing, housing
prices are still falling and defaults are still rising. The market has not yet
recovered.55
With the financial markets in crisis, Congress jumped into action.56
Scores of anti-predatory lending bills were introduced in both Houses, with
lobbyists, commentators, and members of the lending industry speaking
out at every turn. 57 Critics fear that by rushing legislation Congress may

46. See id.
47. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 96.
48. See id.
49. See James F. Bauerle, Fighting Fire with Fire: Technology as Antidote to Excessive
Subprime Lending, 124 BANKING L.J. 714, 714 (2007).
50. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 20.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. The ripple effects are not limited merely to U.S. markets; foreign investment banks and
institutional investors are also heavily involved in the subprime MBS market. See Unterman, supra
note 37, at 101-02.
55. See Edmund L. Andrews, FedChiefShifts Path, InventingPolicy in Crisis,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2008, at Al.
56. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
57. Among the bills introduced include: S.2452, 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Sen.
Dodd; H.R. 4178 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Rep. Castle; H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007),
sponsored by Rep. Miller; H.R. 1852, 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Rep. Waters; S.2338,
110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Sen. Dodd; H.R. 1427, 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by
Barney Frank; H.R. 1752, 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Rep. Biggert; S.2325, 110th Cong.
(2007), sponsored by Sen. Voinovich; H.R. 3837, 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Rep.
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worsen a situation that is not yet fully understood.5 8
III. SUMMARY OF THE HOUSE BILL 3915 OF 2007
On November 15, 2007, the House of Representatives passed House
Bill 3915, The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007
(House Bill 3915), by a margin of 291 to 127 in response to the country's
subprime mortgage crisis. 59 House Bill 3915 was one of a striking number
of bills introduced in the 110th Congress in the months following the
collapse of the subprime housing market.6" Representative Brad Miller (DNC) proposed House Bill 3915 on October 22, 2007, and, with the
additional sponsorship of House Committee on Financial Services
Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA),6 ' the bill passed through committee with
little difficulty. 62 After several substantive amendments were adopted on
the floor of the House, the Committee of the Whole 63 voted in favor of
House Bill 3915 by a comfortable margin. 6 As of this writing, the bill has
been received by the Senate, read twice, and referred to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, where it awaits
consideration.65
First and foremost, it is critical to understand that the House Bill 3915
is not intended to provide any relief whatsoever to aggrieved consumers or

Kanjorski; and the central topic of this Note, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007), sponsored by Rep.
Miller.
58. See 153 CONG. REC. H13983-03 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Price)
(noting that the Wall Street Journaldescribed this bill as "attempting to punish business in general
for the excesses of an unscrupulous few.").
59. See Barry Sher & James Berger, MortgageReform Bill Gains Momentum, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
18, 2007, at 4.
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61. See H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007). Additional cosponsors included: Reps. Joe Baca,
Melissa Bean, Michael Capuano, Julia Carson, Yvette D. Clarke, Wm. Lacy Clay, Emanuel
Cleaver, Steve Cohen, Elijah E. Cummings, Keith Ellison, Gabrielle Giffords, Al Green, Luis V.
Gutierrez, Paul W. Hodes, Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Marcy Kaptur, Steven C. LaTourette, Carolyn
B. Maloney, Gregory W. Meeks, Gwen Moore, Christopher S. Murphy, David Scott, Betty Sutton,
Maxine Waters, Melvin L. Watt, and Albert Russell. Id.
62. The bill passed the Committee on Financial Services by a margin of 45 to 19. See Sher
& Berger, supra note 59, at 4.
63. The term "Committee of the Whole" refers to the entire House of Representatives. See
Charles W. Johnson, How Our Laws are Made, THOMAs.Loc, June 30, 2003,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ lawsmade.bysec/consideration.html#whole.
64. See Sher & Berger, supra note 59, at 4 (H.R. 3915 passed by a margin of 291-127).
65. See H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007) (Received: read twice and referred to the Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in Senate, Dec. 3, 2007).
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investors.66 Instead, House Bill 3915 "is intended to reform mortgage
lending practices to avert a recurrence of the current situation of rising
defaults and foreclosures .... According to Rep. Frank, "What we have
today is a bill that cannot undo what happened but makes it much less
likely that this will happen in the future. 6 ' The House Bill 3915 "would
make numerous changes to federal laws that regulate mortgage practices
with the aim of combating predatory lending practices and providing
certain protections to borrowers and investors. 69
This Note attempts to analyze and critique three main classes of
regulations within House Bill 3915: (1) federal and state agency response;
(2) regulations directed at mortgage brokers and originators and the loan
vehicles they market; and (3) the creation of secondary market participant
liability.
A. Federaland State Agency Response
According to bill sponsors and legal scholars, the housing market
collapsed in part because unscrupulous brokers and originators were able
to exploit borrower inexperience and cognitive biases to pressure
borrowers into ill-fitting subprime loans.70 Commentators propose that a
federal agency should be tasked to protect borrowers and prevent brokers
and lenders from abusing the information gap between lenders and
borrowers. 7 ' To this effect, House Bill 3915 establishes within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) an Office of
Housing Counseling (OHC) designed to advise potential subprime
borrowers and provide information about home ownership and housing
rental. 72 The House Bill 3915 further directs HUD to initiate a national

66. "The fundamental principle of the bill, and many people have lost sight of this, is not to
with these problems when they recur, but to stop them from occurring in the first place."

...deal

153 CONG. REC. H13978 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Frank).
67. H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 35 (2007).

68. Alfred Dellibovi, Viewpoint: A Depression-EraModel for Subprime Fix, 172 Am.
BANKER 10 (2007).
69. H.R.REP.NO. 110-441,at50-51.
70. See id. at 36-38; Patricia McCoy, Symposium: The Middle Class Crunch: Rethinking
Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing,44 HARv. J.ON LEGIS. 123, 124-25 (2007)
[hereinafter McCoy 1]; Patricia A. McCoy, Elder Law: A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory
Lending, 38 AKRON L. REv. 725, 725-26 (2005) [hereinafter McCoy 2] (arguing that "predatory
lenders exploit the behavioral principal of framing effects to manipulate homeowners' otherwise
strong aversion to losing their homes to foreclosure"); Davenport, supra note 4, at 540-45.
71. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep's Clothing: A
Legislative Proposal,21 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 140-44 (2005).
72. See H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. §§ 402-403 (2007).
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public service multimedia campaign informing the populace about
counseling services; to assist states and other key actors in setting up
educational programs; and to study and report to Congress on the nature of
the housing crisis. 7 ' HUD is authorized $45 million per fiscal year from
2008 to 2011 for the OHC.74
In addition, House Bill 3915 dramatically emphasizes federal
prosecution of mortgage fraud. Approximately $32 million for fiscal years
2008 through 2012 will be used to employ 30 additional FBI agents and
two additional Department of Justice prosecutors to investigate and
prosecute incidences of fraud. 75 The FBI is specifically earmarked
$750,000 to support interagency task forces in key locations.7 6
Because brokers and originators mitigate personal risk in subprime
transactions by immediately selling the rights to the loans to investment
banks, these first level actors were continuously engaged in tactics that
sponsors of the House Bill 3915 would characterize as questionable at
best.77 To combat the predatory behavior of individual mortgage brokers,
the House Bill 3915 also establishes a National Mortgage Licensing
System and Registry (NMLSR) that can be established by States with
support from HUD.7 8 This national organization is designed to "increase
uniformity, reduce regulatory burden, enhance consumer protection, and
reduce fraud."79
B. Regulate Lending Practicesand Minimum Loan Standards
Along with creating federal agencies to combat the subprime crisis,
House Bill 3915 sharply regulates brokers and originators and crafts new
minimum loan standards that must be met for all subprime mortgages.8 °
The House Bill 3915 mandates that "[a]ll mortgage originators will be
subject to a federal duty of care that includes presenting consumers with
appropriate mortgage loans.., and full disclosures to borrowers."'" The
new duty of care is designed to force brokers and originators to lend only

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. § 403.
See id. § 404(D).
See id. § 215(1).
See id. § 215(2).
See Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208-09.
See H.R. 3915 § 101.
See id.
See id. §§ 122-305.
MortgageReform BillAdvances in House, 26 AM. BANKR.

INST.

J. 8, 8 (2008).
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when it is appropriate and to end the cycle of brokers churning out
subprime loans. 2
The House Bill 3915 also requires that originators lend to subprime
borrowers only if a borrower has a "reasonable ability to repay" the loan.83
In the case of home refinancings, an originator can only contract with a
borrower if the refinancing creates a "net tangible benefit" to the
borrower.84 This standard "requires lenders to make a reasonable
determination, at the time the mortgage is consummated, that the consumer
has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, or for refinancings, that the new
loan will provide a net tangible benefit to the consumer. "85
Similarly, brokers are prohibited from steering any consumer from a
prime loan to a subprime loan or "engaging in abusive or unfair lending
practices that promote disparities among consumers of equal credit
worthiness but different race, ethnicity, gender or age.,,86 These new
requirements will, according to House Bill 3915 supporters, reduce the gap
between actual borrower need and current sales trends.87
House Bill 3915 further protects consumers by limiting the types of
loans and loan features brokers and originators can market to subprime
borrowers.88 The House Bill 3915 targets loan features deemed to be per
se inappropriate for subprime residential home loans.89 House Bill 3915
sets out to accomplish this goal by:
1. Lowering the APR trigger from 10% to 8% over comparable treasury
bonds.
2. Lowering the points and fee trigger from 8% to 5% and including
additional costs and fees in the trigger.
3. Prohibiting the financing of points and fees.

82. See H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 35 (2007).
83. H.R. 3915 § 201.
84. Id. § 202.
85. Leah Nylen & Benton Ives, CQ Bill Analysis HR 3915-Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatoryLending Act of 2007, CONG. Q., Dec. 29, 2007.
86. Id.
87. The fact that risky consumers were afforded huge amounts ofcredit sparked apprehension
among investors because no credit provider, bond dealer, or investor knew how exposed other
financial institutions were. See H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 37-38. This apprehension tightened the
credit market and caused further foreclosures damaging the housing market. See id. The House
Committee on Financial Services reported that "[floreclosures can trigger domino effects that result
in housing abandonment and declining property values in surrounding neighborhoods." Id. at 37.
88. See H.R. 3915 §§ 101-306 (2007).
89. See infra text accompanying note 90.
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4. Prohibiting excessive fees for payoff information, modification or late
payments.
5. Prohibiting practices that increase the risk of foreclosure, such as
balloon payments, encouraging a borrower to default and call
provisions.
6. Requiring pre-loan counseling.9"
The House Bill 3915 establishes minimum standards for qualified
mortgages and qualified safe harbor mortgages.9' It also creates an
unrebuttable presumption that prime loans meet the minimum standards. 92
However, for qualified safe harbor loans, the presumption may be rebutted
as against creditors only.93 Loans made or guaranteed by the Veterans
Affairs Department will be designated as qualified loans. 94 House Bill
3915 also creates new disclosure guidelines for statements on credit
extensions and mortgage loans with variable interest rates.95
C. Secondary Market Actor Liability
Oftentimes, under the current predatory lending regime, aggrieved
borrowers are left without an effective remedy. Consumers already have
a private cause of action against predatory brokers and originators.
However, the cause of action is often frustrated because typical subprime
lenders have very few assets, and they quickly resort to bankruptcy in the
event of a lawsuit, which prevents injured borrowers from receiving any
actual compensation.96 Further, which assignees and other secondary actors
were protected by the "holder in due course" theory, which prevents
borrowers from suing the investment banks who bought and securitized
their mortgage or the investors who bought it.97

90. Nylen & Ives, supra note 85.
91. See H.R. 3915 § 203.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. § 212-14.
96. See Unterman, supra note 37, at 96. "Since the beginning of 2006, twenty-three subprime lenders have filed for bankruptcy, including the nation's second largest lender, First National.
Over the past twelve months over sixty sub-prime lenders have ceased operations or solicited
buyers." Id.
97. The holder in due course doctrine states that "one who holds an instrument that has been
indorsed to him is not chargeable with knowledge of or participation in certain wrongful acts, then
most of the defenses that the maker of the note had to the original beneficiary of the note cannot
be used against the new holder." Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codificationand the Victory
ofForm Over Intent in Negotiable InstrumentofLaw, 35 CREIGHToN L. REv. 363,375 (2002). "By
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To combat this perceived inconsistency, the House Bill 3915 grants
consumers a private cause of action against secondary actors, not including
investors, in certain circumstances. 98 Assignees and securitizers will be
liable for damages if they purchase loans that do not meet the minimum
standards established by House Bill 3915. 99 This provision preempts state
law, which means that investment firms will only be held accountable at
the federal level. °0 However, states will remain free to pass stricter laws
against lenders and originators.'
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCY RESPONSE

Since the inception of subprime lending for home loans, borrowers,
lenders, and originators have been regulated primarily by static legislation
including Truth In Lending Act (TILA), Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (RESPA), and Home Owners Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).102 The
House Bill 3915 creates one federal entity and one national registry tasked
specifically to protect borrowers and regulate brokers and originators.103
They are the OHC and the NMLSR.
A. Office of Housing Counseling
As the subprime market developed, brokers and lenders grew more and
more efficient at using borrowers' inexperience and cognitive biases to
pressure borrowers into loans that were unsuitable for their particular

eliminating the holder in due course defense for loans that violate the above sales rules... the
secondary market would have an incentive to police loan sellers." Willis, supra note 13, at 828.
98. See H.R. 3915 § 204.
99. See id.
§ 208.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (2000); Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000); Home Owners Equity Protection Act 15 U.S.C.
§ 1649 (2000). "These statutes were written when the sole conventional mortgage market was the
prime market and access to home mortgages was limited to customers with strong credit." McCoy
1,supra note 70 at 123-24. "[Ihe federal government has not yet enacted any statutes to regulate
mortgage brokers through licensing or certification laws that would condition entry into the
mortgage brokering business, monitor the conduct ofbrokers once in business, and sanction brokers
who engage in undesirable conduct." Lloyd T. Wilson Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility,
Preemption, and HermeneuticalCriticisms of ProposedFederalRegulation ofMortgageBrokers,
59 S.C. L. REV. 61, 63-64 (2007).

103. See H.R. 3915 § 102, 402.
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needs."° House Bill 3915 attempts to level the playing field by creating a
federal agency whose primary task is to counsel borrowers about their
mortgages and refinancings throughout the home loan process."°5 The
House Bill 3915 shifts the transactional paradigm by creating "an equally
knowledgeable counter-balancing influence [that will] be available to
possible victims before they close on a potentially predatory loan."'0 6
Organized within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development," 7 the OHC will be beneficial to consumers in two primary
ways. First, borrowers will be less likely to purchase loans they have no
reasonable chance of repaying." 8 The OHC will help steer borrowers away
from inappropriate loans and will shield borrowers from abusive broker
practices.0 9 The counseling service is designed to eliminate the disparity
in bargaining power between the "silver tongued" broker and the
uneducated subprime borrower. "0 Second, by enabling the government to
employ expert financial analysts to scour loan vehicles, the federal
government will be able to stay ahead of new and original lending features
that may ultimately prove to have predatory effects.l"' Simply put, one of
the goals of the OHC is to obviate the need for future reactive legislation
by federal or state governments." 2 The OHC will train its employees to
understand the evolving housing market in order to preemptively stop
brokers and lenders from creating an unstable marketplace. "3

104. See McCoy 2, supranote 70, at 726. "Through clever marketing, distraction and an often
legal lack of transparency concerning the true risks involved, predatory lenders are able to divert
the focus of homeowners from the fear of losing their homes to other fears, many of which are often
conducive to less destructive solutions." Id.
105. See H.R. 3915 § 402.
106. Stark, supra note 71 at 130.
107. See H.R. 3915 § 402(g)(1) ("There is established, in the Office of the Secretary, the
Office of Housing Counseling.")
108. See Stark, supra note 71, at 142 ("The approved mortgage counselor would also be
trained to analyze for the borrower whether the proposed high-cost home loan is 'affordable' and
whether it makes economic sense for the borrower to enter into the high-cost [home] loan when it
is a refinancing.")
109. See id.
110. See id.
at 130.
111. H.R. 3915 § 402(g)(3)(A) ("The Director shall have ultimate responsibility within the
Department... for all activities.., including ...establishment, coordination, and administration
of all regulations, requirements, standards, and performance measures ....
112. Stark, supra note 71, at 145.
113. This argument rests on the assumption that the Director of OHC will establish training
guidelines such that mortgage counselors stay current with the times, and are not left rigidly
applying old standards.
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Because each borrower is likely to have a different set of needs and
limitations, the OHC will have to allocate resources such that OHC
employees will be able to familiarize themselves with each individual
consumer." 4 Generalized advice will simply not work in a subprime
marketplace." 5 HUD is directed to provide advice and technical assistance
to states, local governmental entities, and nonprofit organizations in the
hope that these entities will use the existing infrastructure to help spread
the word about counseling. Perhaps more importantly, HUD is also
directed to extend the reach of OHC so that each borrower will have more
face time with someone on his or her side. "6 In order to educate consumers
about the availability of counseling, Section 403 authorizes the director of
OHC to develop and utilize national public service multimedia campaigns
to target at-risk consumers." 7
One of the overlooked benefits of the counseling service is its potential
to help overcome subprime borrowers' behavioral and cognitive biases."18
Patricia A. McCoy identifies three key errors many subprime borrowers
make." 9 First, they are insensitive to interest rates and annual percentage
rates. 2 ° Subprime borrowers are more likely to focus instead on whether
initial monthly rates are affordable.' 2 ' Subprime borrowers tend to equate
the likelihood of successfully making the first payment with the likelihood
of paying off the entire loan.'22 Third, consumers underestimate general
risks and overestimate catastrophic risks. 123 For example, subprime
borrowers are usually more worried about what happens if they die than
about what happens if they default on payment.'24 Federal counseling can
eradicate these problems if it is administered in such a way as to inspire

114. See Stark, supra note 71, at 148 ("[T]he key cost would be training an adequate number
of mortgage counselors .... ").
115. In the same way that consumers are unable to take advantage of price shopping because
brokers cannot generalize a price for subprime mortgages, mortgage counselors will be unable to
generalize advice. See supra text accompanying note 13.
116. SeeH.R. 3915 § 403(g)(5).
117. See H.R. 3915 § 403.
118. McCoy points out a clear inconsistency: "Loss-averse homeowners should be highly
reluctant to enter into loan transactions that threaten their future homeownership. Yet numerous
subprime borrowers do precisely that. The answer to this paradox lies in how predatory lenders
frame their sales pitches in order to manipulate the preference ordering of homeowners ......
McCoy 2, supra note 70, at 729.
119. See id. at 736.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See McCoy 2, supra note 70, at 736.
124. See id.
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trust among borrowers. 2 Trained mortgage counselors should be prepared
to address cognitive and behavioral biases in order to reach out to
inexperienced subprime consumers. These behavioral inconsistencies also
highlight the need for HUD to effectively distribute information about the
OHC.
One chief criticism of the counseling service is that it places too much
of the onus on individual borrowers instead of on brokers. 126 However,
when viewed in concert with other provisions of House Bill 3915, the
consumer is asked to carry only part of the burden. Asking consumers to
help protect themselves should not be considered overly burdensome.
Furthermore, the OHC "assumes that cognitive anomalies can be
eradicated.' ' 2 7 But new data belies that assumption as "there is increasing
evidence that experience and learning do not succeed in eliminating
cognitive biases or improve' 2people's
ability to apply the principles they
8
learn to specific situations.'
The additional flexibility built into the concept of counseling allows
HUD to stop predatory lending by responding to evolving harm as opposed
to rigidly outlawing a list of practices. 129 The OHC will be able to counsel
borrowers to avoid potential pitfalls if brokers and lenders eventually find
and exploit loopholes in the system. 30 If the OHC is effective, it will serve
to mitigate future crises and to preempt the need for additional reactive
legislation, while not over-inflating an already bloated regulatory system.'31

125. Trust is an important issue for the OHC. Unless subprime borrowers trust the federal
agency (perhaps an uphill battle given the anti-government predisposition of many uneducated
borrowers), borrowers may end up siding with the broker who came to them in the first place. If
borrowers are counseled toward appropriate loan A and instead choose predatory loan B, then OHC
will be worthless.
126. See Wilson, supra note 102, at 90 ("It should not be the obligation of the consumer to
take steps to avoid being cheated; it should be the obligation of the mortgage broker not to cheat.").
127. McCoy 2, supra note 70, at 738.
128. Id. (citing a study by Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LiT. 11,
36(1998)).
129. See Willis, supranote 13, at 739 ("[P]redatory home lending should be defined based on
the harms that we seek to prevent, rather than based on a list of predatory practices .... [L]oan
seller practices mutate in response to bans on particular practices and are limited only by the
ingenuity of loan sellers."). Counselors, as living breathing people, can react to loan sellers and
counsel accordingly.
130. See id. But cf McCoy 2, supra note 70, at 738 ("Predatory lenders will always be better
at reaching potential victims than legitimate lenders, community groups, churches, and the
government.").
131. Wilson, supra note 102, at 74.
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B. NationalMortgage Licensing System and Registry
"In order to increase uniformity, reduce regulatory burden, enhance
consumer protection, and reduce fraud," the House Bill 3915 establishes
a Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry (NMLSR) that will
regulate admission to the mortgage broker profession and monitor brokers
and lenders.'32 Potential licensees would be required to furnish background
information to the NMLSR including fingerprints and personal history.'33
Applicants must meet certain minimum standards such as pre-licensing
education and written tests to be considered for admittance into the
registry.'34 Federal banking agencies would develop and maintain a system
for registering the employees of banks and their subsidiaries as registered
loan originators with the NMLSR. ' If a state does not have a system that
meets the minimum standards for state-licensed loan originators or does
not participate in the NMLSR, then HUD would establish136a backup
licensing system for loan originators that operate in that state.
The imposition of the registration and licensing system has met little
resistance from critics of the bill.'37 In fact, the National Association of
Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) has been trying lobbied in favor of a national
licensing system for some time. 138 The NAMB argues that the majority of
predatory lending occurrences can be traced back to brokers' simple
mistakes rather than willful deceptive practices.139 According to the
NAMB, mortgage brokers are not trying to abuse consumers; instead, lack
and expertise cause frequent lending errors that injure the
of education
40
1
consumer.

132. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007).
133. Nylen & Ives, supra note 85.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. One notable critic of this section has been Rep. Ron Paul, see infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
House Passes New Legislation, VIRG.
138. See, e.g., Mortgage Brokers Fear "Extinction" if
PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Dec. 1, 2007, at 10 [hereinafter Mortgage Brokers Fear "Extinction ']
(NAMB president George Hanzimanolis was quoted as saying "'These provisions represent a huge
victory for consumers and for NAMB, which has fought for years to make it easier for consumers
to compare loan products offered in the different mortgage sources, such as banks, lenders and
mortgage brokers."').
139. See Wilson, supra note 102, at 74.
140. See id. ("Increased knowledge and training, NAMB argues, will eliminate the mistakes
and produce good loan brokering.")
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The NMLSR will limit the number and types of people who traffic in
mortgages and will require continuing education. 4 ' As a result, the
"professional" brokers and originators will be less likely to engage in the
predatory lending practices that have proven detrimental to the profession
and to the housing market in general. 4 This policy rests on an inherent
assumption that there is a positive correlation between expertise and
honesty and that "professional behavior will flow automatically from
technical training and knowledge."' 43 However, it may be that predatory
lending is a function of rent seeking and profitability and is not, as the
NAMB contends, attributable to broker error.'"
Undoubtedly, the licensing system will make it easier for the Federal
Bureau of Investigations and the Department of Justice to investigate and
prosecute dishonest brokers who engage in predatory lending."'
Previously, it was startlingly easy for brokers to bounce from state to state
preying on at-risk borrowers.'" With the NMLSR in place, 147
dishonest
difficult.
more
far
scheme
a
such
find
will
brokers and lenders
The NMLSR will be effective in regulating broker activity because it
will evolve and adapt with the changing housing market. If the NMLSR
remains active and energetic in standardizing the industry, unscrupulous
brokers and originators will find it increasingly difficult to operate
dishonestly. Though the NMLSR is only a minor step, it is a necessary and
important one.
Free market advocates like Republican Representative Ron Paul argue
that this type of governmental interference is bound to impede natural
market forces, harming investors and borrowers alike. 48 In the case of the

141. SeeH.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007).
142. See MortgageBrokers Fear "Extinction," supra note 138, at 10 ("These reforms will
help modernize the regulatory system and drive bad actors from our industry.").
143. Wilson, supra note 102, at 73.
144. See id.("[A]dditional training and knowledge simplywiden the informational and power
asymmetries between the broker and the consumer and produce a more effective predator.").
145. See H.R. 3915 § 215(1), (2).
146. See 153 CONG. REc. H13986 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Capito).
147. See id; see also Frank Bowersox, Mortgage Madness: The Best Way to Protect Home
Buyers is to License Loan Originators, PIrrSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 2007, at F2
("Requiring every loan originator in the state to be licensed would provide an opportunity to assign
a tracking number so that if an individual perpetuates any form of abusive lending on Pennsylvania
consumers, he or she will not simply be able to change jobs to avoid detection.").
148. See H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 111 (2007). "Mandatory background checks and
fingerprinting are not a panacea, will not eliminate mortgage fraud, and are an affront to a free and
open labor market." Id. (comments of Rep. Paul). Further by restricting the number of people able
to work in the mortgage industry, the laws of economics state that "when the supply of mortgage
providers decreases, the cost of retaining those services will increase." Id.
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subprime market, the risks of added friction by a government agency are
far outweighed by the societal costs attendant to high foreclosure levels.
Certainly the housing market will be forced to realign itself. However, the
counseling service provides a guarantee to consumers that the government
will not stand idly by. If the OHC and NMLSR achieve their intended
goals, they may help foster a renewed sense of trust in the housing market.
V. REGULATE LENDING PRACTICES AND MINIMUM LOAN STANDARDS
Along with its Federal Agency Response, House Bill 3915 attempts to
directly and indirectly protect consumers by initiating a federal duty of care
for mortgage originators and affirmatively requiring brokers and lenders
to use diligence when extending credit to borrowers with the creation of
new suitability standards for subprime loans.' 49 Additionally, the House
Bill 3915 prohibits the use of several mortgage features deemed
inappropriate for subprime loans. 15
A. FederalDuty of Care and SuitabilityStandards
House Bill 3915 Section 122 sets forth a federal duty of care for
residential loan originators. 5 ' The House Bill 3915 instructs mortgage
originators to diligently work to present each consumer with loans fitting
his or her individual needs. 152 The House Bill 3915, however, stops short
of creating an agency or fiduciary relationship between a mortgage
originator and a consumer. 5 3 In conjunction with this duty of care, House
Bill 3915 requires creditors to make a reasonable determination at the time
the mortgage is consummated that the consumer has a reasonable ability
to repay the loan.'54 Alternatively, if the transaction is a refinancing, the
House Bill 3915 requires that the refinanced loan provides a "net tangible
benefit" to the consumer. 55
' It must be noted, however, that the federal duty
of care applies only to subprime transactions; there is an unrebuttable
149. SeeH.R. 3915 § 122, 202.
150. See id. §§ 201-306.
151. See id. § 122.
152. See id. ("[W]ith respect to each consumer seeking or inquiring about a residential
mortgage loan, diligently work to present the consumer with a range of residential mortgage loan
products for which the consumer likely qualifies and which are appropriate to the consumer's
existing circumstances.")
153. See id. § 122. This is true so long as the originator does not hold himself or herself out
as an agent or fiduciary. See id.
154. See H.R. 3915 § 201.
155. Id. § 202.
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presumption that prime loans meet these standards.' 56 Furthermore, the
House Bill 3915 prohibits the payment of steering incentive compensation
to mortgage originators based on, or varying with, the terms (other than the
principal amount) of any loan that is not a qualified mortgage. 5 7
Creating a federal duty of care is a bold step. The subprime crisis came
about, in part, because brokers, lenders, and mortgage originators were able
to circumvent TILA's and HOEPA's existing anti-predatory lending
provisions. 5 8 Often, mortgage originators used the letter of the law to their
advantage. 15 9 For instance, by disclosing everything to prospective
borrowers, mortgage originators inundated them with complicated
financial documents that they were incapable of understanding. 60 Brokers
and originators were able to chum out inappropriate mortgages without
ever running afoul of TILA or HOEPA regulations. 6 ' Consumers routinely
place a great deal of trust in mortgage originators because consumers need
someone to coach them through the extremely complicated home loan
process.62
1 Unfortunately, brokers and originators often acted in their own
163
best interest, pressuring borrowers into loans they could not repay.
Predatory brokers and originators effectively insulated themselves from

156. See id. § 203.
157. See id. § 123.
158. See Stark, supranote 71, at 137-39. Predatory devices including pushing overpriced loans
("i.e., one where the interest rate, fees, and closing costs are higher than market rates..."), equity
stripping (having borrowers take more and more equity from their home by constantly refinancing
to pay off other debts), and loan flipping ("numerous refinancing ofa mortgage loan where the costs
exceed the savings and there is no net economic benefit to the borrower) without running afoul of
any particular federal law. See id.at 137.
159. See Willis, supranote 13, at 740 ("[N]ew practices resulting in the same harm will simply
rise to take the place of any that are banned, such as has already occurred in the use of open-ended
credit to circumvent protections in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).")
160. See id. at 752. For instance, "only about 10% of respondents in a survey of consumers
who had applied for or obtained home loans in the previous five years understood the concept of
APR well enough to accurately answer whether the APR is higher, the same, or lower than the note
or contract interest rate." Id. at 752. Even more striking, the National Adult Literacy Survey found
that only 4% of U.S households could perform multiple arithmetic calculations sequentially when
parts of the problem had to be found in text or when background knowledge was necessary. See id.
at 753.
161. See supra text accompanying note 158.
162. Hammond, supra note 27, at 179 ("Unsophisticated borrowers react positively to
marketing efforts of those who provide the impression that they are working in the best interests of
the borrower and who lull the borrower into thinking that these individuals are 'experts' and
'friends."').
163. Id.at 179-80.
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risk of borrower default by selling the rights to inappropriate mortgages to
investment banks eager to create and sell mortgage backed securities. 64
As written, the duty of care takes great strides to eliminate that kind of
behavior. Originators must offer loans that borrowers have a "reasonable
ability to repay. 1 65 House Bill 3915 requires lenders to diligently examine
166
the needs of borrowers, or risk breaching the federal duty of care.
Furthermore, the "net tangible benefit standard" for refinancings prevents
originators from perpetuating
the cycle in which subprime borrowers often
167
found themselves.
Critics complain that the suitability standard is far too subjective to be
an effective tool. 68 Without definitive standards, originators may be
hesitant to extend loans to subprime borrowers at all. Real Estate Attorney
Stuart Saft frames the issue as
Who will be able to say what is reasonable or taken in good faith?
Would you like to make a loan if years later you can be called
before a federal agency or a jury and cross-examined as to whether
your actions were reasonable? Could some aggressive prosecutor
one day attempt
to make his or her career by going after a lender
169
criminally?
Law Professors Patricia Engel and Kathleen McCoy suggest that any
suitability provision must be accompanied by an administrative body that
would establish price guidelines for different borrowers as well as what the
diligence requirements mean on an individual consumer basis. 7 ° House
Bill 3915 potentially accounts for this by creating the OHC.' 7' Hopefully,
as counseling develops it will drive out a great deal of the subjectivity
inherent in the suitability doctrine. However, at this point, it remains
unclear whether the OHC will actually have this effect.

164. See Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208-10 (explaining the securitization process in detail).
165. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 201(a)(129B)(a)(1) (2007).
166. Id.
167. 153 CONG. REC. H 13985 (daily ed. Nov. 15,2007) (statement of Rep. Miller) (describing
why the highest risk loans were being marketed to the most unsophisticated borrowers: "[T]o take
advantage ofthem, to separate from middle-class homeowners more and more of the equity in their
home, to trap them in a cycle of having to borrow and borrow again, and every time they borrowed,
losing more of the equity in their homes.").
168. 153 CONG. REC. H 14032 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Feeney) ("These
subjective tests are a nightmare for people trying to provide credit in America.").
169. Stuart M. Saft, The Anti-MortgageLending Act, WALL ST.J., Nov. 10, 2007, at All).
170. Engel & McCoy, supra note 32, at 2081-86.
171. H.R.3915 § 402.
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Further, even if the suitability doctrine operates as intended, it will
burden borrowers to bring a cause of action after they are harmed by an
unsuitable loan. 7 2 However, since House Bill 3915 mandates pre-loan
counseling, borrowers will not be alone during this process. 173 At least one
commentator acknowledged this dovetailing, "[m]aking mortgage brokers
liable for inducing borrowers to enter into loans that they cannot afford or
that do not provide a net economic benefit would be an additional
protection to borrowers that would complement mortgage counseling.' 74
Though some have called the federal duty of care and suitability
requirements unreasonably subjective, 175 a more fitting expression would
describe them as flexible. TLA and HOEPA are currently too rigid in
application to protect against predatory lending practices in an everchanging housing market. 176 The federal duty of care does not share that
limitation. Borrowers will be able to seek redress against originators
regardless of what form their subprime mortgage happens to take. 17 7 As it
is nearly impossible to predict what types of loans will be marketed in the
78
conceivable future, it is essential to build an adaptable legal framework. 1
Moreover, though it may be the case that originators may hesitate to extend
loans to certain subprime borrowers, 179 this result may prove beneficial to
the housing market. If the market evolves to the point where all residential
home loans will be reasonably repaid, then the secondary market will be
able to securitize pools of mortgages without the fear of default. Simply
put, the market will realign to a more concrete and efficient system without
the underlying risk that caused the current housing market collapse.

172. Section 205 only authorizes a consumer who has the right to rescind a mortgage loan
against a creditor, assignee, or securitizer that right once foreclosure proceedings have already
begun. Id. § 205.
173. H.R. § 403 (outlining counseling procedures).
174. Stark, supra note 71, at 146-47.
175. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
177. H.R. 3915 § 204-05 (proscribing civil liability against creditors for violations of this Act,
and allowing aggrieved borrowers the right rescind the loan as a defense or counterclaim to
foreclosure).
178. TILA, in particular, was written in a time when a typical mortgage transaction involved
merely a borrower and an originator. Now, with upwards of eleven participants in the home loan
marketplace, TILA is simply outdated. It is reasonable to think that even an updated version of
TILA will become antiquated within a few years. Willis, supra note 13, at 740.
179. See Saft, supra note 169.
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B. New Minimum MortgageStandards
House Bill 3915 rewrites existing federal mortgage standards. 8 It
explicitly prohibits certain practices, including some prepayment penalties,
single premium credit insurance, mandatory arbitration (except for reverse
mortgages), mortgage loan provisions that waive statutory causes of action
by the consumer, and negative amortization mortgages. 8 ' The Bill also
creates a suitability standard for all mortgages and refinancings. 182Finally,
it amends existing disclosure
laws to increase transparency in the
83
residential loan market. 1
The House Bill 3915 redefines high cost mortgages under HOEPA in
key areas. It prohibits:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

184
balloon payments for high-cost mortgages;
lending without due regard to debtor's repayment
ability;" 5
18 6
creditor recommendation to debtor to default;
187
certain late fees in connection with a high-cost mortgage;
debt acceleration at creditor's sole discretion;' 88
189
creditor financing of certain financing points and fees;
evasions, structuring of transactions and reciprocal arrangements; 90
certain creditor imposed fees for modification, deferral, and payoff
statements;191
extending credit to a consumer under a high-cost loan without
92
receiving certification from a HUD or state counselor; and'
knowingly or intentionally
engaging in flipping in connection with
193
a high-cost mortgage.

180. H.R. 3915 tits. II-IL.
181. Id. § 206.
182. Id. §§ 201-02; see supra Part V.A of this Note for an in-depth analysis of the suitability
provisions.
183. H.R. 3915 §§ 212-14.
184. Id. § 302.
185. Id.
186. Id.§ 303.
187. Id.
188. H.R. 3915 § 303.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. H.R.3915 § 303.
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The House Bill 3915 intrepidly establishes these practices as per se
predatory. In doing so, House Bill 3915 severely limits available loan
options originators may market to potential subprime borrowers.' 94
Critics of the House Bill 3915 have been vocal in opposition to these
limitations. The "Additional Views" portion of the House Committee on
Financial Services Report explains:
Never before have [the House of Representatives] adopted such farreaching government restrictions and limitations on loan terms and
products and underwriting decisions in the private market, that
affect the ability of thousands of this country's borrowers to obtain
a mortgage loan to finance or refinance their home. While this bill's
breadth will affect the mortgage markets serving all segments of our
society, its negative impact on the availability and affordability of
credit to those borrowers, including minority borrowers, with
blemished credit histories, will be most dire.' 95
According to opposition, it is not the loans themselves that are
96
predatory; they are only predatory when extended to the wrong borrower. 1
The subprime market will rebound more quickly, and consumers will be
far better off, if lenders retain the freedom to offer and consumers have the
freedom to choose from the widest range of financial products and
options.'97
There is evidence that that market has already begun to correct itself
' Large investment banks have stopped purchasing loans that
organically. 98
are unlikely to be repaid.' 99 Certain disfavored loan products are already
194. John Norman, Efforts to Address Subprime Crisis Flawed,DESERET MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 26, 2007, at A 14 ("Attempts to address the subprime mortgage crisis merely restrict consumer
choice by preventing certain types of mortgages from being made.").
195. H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 107 (cosigned by Reps. Feeney, Roskam, Davis, Pearce,
Bachman, Price, McHenry, Garrett, Campbell, Marchant, and Neugebauer).
196. See 153 CONG. REC. H 13983 (daily ed. Nov. 15,2007) (statement of Rep. Price) ("[Tjhis
bill is essentially a 'Sarbanes-Oxley for housing, an attempt to punish business in general for the
excesses of an unscrupulous few."').
197. Bob Mitchell, Editorial:Proposal Would Mean Less Competition, Higher Costs for
Consumers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 2007, at B7 ("[T]he danger is that this misguided
effort would severely limit competition in the mortgage industry .... It would leave people with
fewer home financing choices and all but guarantee that they would end up paying more when they
finance a home purchase.").
198. 153 CONG. REc. H13979 (daily ed. Nov. 15,2007) (statement of Rep. Royce) ("Now, we
have had some signs of self-correction in the mortgage market.").
199. Id. at H13979-80 ("Lenders are underwriting mortgages much more carefully as a result
of market discipline.").
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becoming scarce.200 Not only does House Bill 3915 emphatically ignore
these natural market advances, it may in fact inhibit them.20 ' By restricting
loan products, the House Bill 3915 will unquestionably make it more
difficult for many subprime borrowers to obtain the credit necessary to
purchase a home.20 2 Moreover, per se restrictions rest on the faulty
assumption that certain loan features can never be appropriate for
borrowers. 3 For instance, would not a young doctor in residency be
willing to take out a loan containing a delayed balloon payment knowing
that his income is going to drastically increase once he finishes his
residency program? It is not difficult to imagine additional examples.
House Bill 3915's sweeping restrictions miss the mark in another sense
as well. Looking at the development of the subprime market, it would have
been impossible for previous generations of lawmakers to forecast the
types of loans that would eventually be used for predatory purposes."°
There is no such thing as a typical subprime mortgage; there is a huge and
ever-changing array of available subprime loans on the market.20 5 It is
unrealistic to expect that the prohibitions in House Bill 3915 will have any
long term positive effect. In time, dishonest mortgage originators will be
able to create products that are predatory in new ways.20 6 If borrowers

200. Id. at H13980 ("Products which have proven to be unfit for certain borrowers such lowdoc loans, short-term hybrid ARMS, interest-only products, those are becoming increasingly hard
to find. Those have been pushed out of the market.").
201. Id. ("But the legislation before us today ignores such advances. Not only does this bill
fail to account for the progress made in the market, it has the potential to seriously restrict access
to credit for millions of Americans looking to purchase a home or refinance their mortgage.").
202. "The effects of the bill, I believe, would be to regulate subprime and other nonconforming mortgages out of existence." Mitchell, supra note 197, at B7.
203. See Abraham B. Putney, Note, Rules, Standards,and Suitability: Findingthe Correct
Approach to PredatoryLending, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2101, 2137 (2003) (arguing that any rulebased predatory lending legislation is bound to be criticized as being too strict or too lax depending
on individual borrower characteristics); Mitchell, supra note 197, at B7 ("I liken it to driving a
Lamborghini. Just because not everyone has the skill to drive one ofthese high-powered sports cars
doesn't mean that it should be illegal to sell them.").
204. Private securitization did not begin until the late 1970s, and it was not until the 1990s that
securitization for subprime mortgage loans began to take off, prompting an increased demand for
loan originators to extend credit to borrowers with poor credit. See Peterson, supra note 11, at
2199-206. Originators responded by creating exotic home loan packages that had never been seen
before. Id.
205. See id. at 2214 (quoting Michael D. Larson, It's Buyer Beware When You're Shopping
for a Subprime Loan, BANKRATE.COM, Feb. 2, 2001, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/
20000420.asp ("That means supbrime originators have much more leeway when it comes to setting
rates and underwriting standards. As a result, rates, fees, and program guidelines vary drastically
depending on which broker or lender a consumer visits.")).
206. Willis, supra note 13, at 740.
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submit to federal mortgage counseling and lenders fully disclose the nature
of the loans, making loans features per se illegal is redundant at best and
irresponsible and misguided at worst. It seems shortsighted to rigidly
restrict access to credit when these loan vehicles may indeed be appropriate
for some subprime borrowers." 7
In addition to regulating the loans themselves, the House Bill 3915
rewrites current mortgage disclosure requirements." 8 Over the last several
years, the subprime market has been extraordinarily opaque. 2 9 Borrowers
simply had no idea what their mortgages required of them. Professor
Lauren Willis identified three significant problems of disclosure under the
current legislative scheme: (1) logistical problems of timing and expense;
(2) incomplete information; and (3) borrower financial illiteracy. 210 The
Bill aspires to increase transparency in the home loan market by redefining
disclosure standards.
The new disclosure requirements of House Bill 3915 include: (a)
notification when hybrid adjustable rate mortgage adjust or resets to a
variable interest rate; 211 (b) additional information on variable payments,
escrow or impound account, aggregate settlement charges, aggregate
mortgage origination loan fees, payment schedules, and updating of
APRs; 212 (c) specified disclosures in monthly statements including the
amount of the principal obligation of the mortgage, the current interest rate
and the date on which the interest rate may next reset or
of the 21loan
3
adjust.

When taken in conjunction with required pre-loan counseling, the
newly standardized disclosures may dramatically improve transparency. If,
on the other hand, borrowers are left to interpret the terms of their loans
without effective counseling (even with the higher level of disclosure), the
supplementary disclosures will prove to be a case of too much information.
Mortgage brokers argue that disclosure is not the problem. The
following sentiment is representative of their views: "[B]etween a

207. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
208. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 212-14 (2007).
209. See Willis, supra note 13, at 749-54; McCoy 1, supra note 70, at 137.
210. Willis, supra note 13, at 749-54. McCoy, on the other hand, identifies four key problems
with the current state of disclosure laws: (1) federal law does not require accurate disclosure before
the payment of the applications fee; (2) TILA's variable rate disclosures are too complex; (3) other
than for HOEPA loans, TILA disclosure on APR and other key price terms can be delayed until
closing; and (4) binding cost disclosures are ordinarily not required. McCoy 1, supra note 70, at
137-38.
211. H.R.3915 § 212.
212. Id. § 213.
213. Id. § 214.
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consumer's initial application for a mortgage loan and closing, the terms
of the mortgage have been 'disclosed' to him at least five times. For
consumers to claim that they weren't informed simply is nonsense.""2 4
With this in mind, critics believe that additional disclosure may only serve
to complicate things further.2" 5 As it is, "[t]he federal disclosures contain
too many items for most consumers to consider them all. 216 Further
complicating matters, courts have held that borrowers do not have a right
to a federal mortgage price disclosure that they actually understand.2 7
Critics and brokers note that non-English speaking consumers oftentimes
receive their disclosures only in English. 218 House Bill 3915 will do
nothing to change this apparent inequity.
With these criticisms in minds, the solution then is not more disclosure,
but more efficient disclosure. Mandating particular disclosures would only
temporarily inform borrowers, even if they understand what they are
reading.2 9 The mortgage industry is constantly evolving, and just as the
rise of securitization enabled new loan vehicles, in the upcoming years
there are likely to be new and different ways that brokers will be able to get
around the proposed disclosure rules. 220 Furthermore, it is unlikely that
disclosures in the subprime market will ever be simple enough to be
understood by the average consumer.2 2' Because subprime loans are
inherently riskier than prime loans, subprime loans will always require
complicated or exotic features to balance risk and reward.222
Traditional average cost pricing simply does not work for the subprime
market. 223 Lauren E. Willis succinctly states the issue: "The existing
disclosures made sense in a world of fairly uniform loan products,
containing a standardized package of features for the borrower to

214. Mitchell, supra note 197, at B7.
215. See Willis, supra note 13, at 768 ("But in today's marketplace of loans with multifarious
complex structures, the disclosures have become encrusted with layer upon layer of additions to
meet each new complexity in the product."). Unless subprime mortgages become less complicated,
which is unlikely based on the allocation of risk for originators, additional disclosure requirements
will have difficulty keeping up with the pace of a changing marketplace.
216. Id.
217. Id.at 797.
218. Id.This fact becomes even more important in consideration of the fact that, based on the
ethnic makeup of subprime borrowers, many are likely to speak languages other than English as
their primary, and perhaps only, language.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
220. See generally Peterson, supra note 11, at 2199-206.
221. See supra text accompanying note 215.
222. See supra Parts II and III.
223. See McCoy 1, supra note 70 at 125-27.
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compare., 224 Years from now, it will be possible to apply these same
sentiments to the new regime ofdisclosures. The House of Representatives
overreacts to the housing crisis without giving deep enough thought to the
ultimate ramifications of its actions. In short, by listing specifically
prohibited practices, this portion of House Bill 3915 is reactive instead of
proactive, will do little to prevent future mortgage crises, and may actually
serve to magnify existing problems.

VI. SECONDARY MARKET ACTOR LIABILITY

If a residential mortgage loan does not satisfy minimum standards of
House Bill 3915, the Bill provides the borrower with a private cause of
action against the lender, each assignee of the loan, and parties that acquire
the loans in a securitization transaction.225 Creating assignee and securitizer
liability is a huge step in attempting to provide subprime borrowers with
appropriate redress for injury. 226 House Bill 3915 completely eliminates the
"holder in due course" doctrine as a defense for secondary market actors
who acquire loans made in violation of House Bill 3915 minimum loan
standards. 227 Even assignees and securitizers acting in good faith may be
liable to borrowers if they are found to be trafficking in substandard
residential home loans. 228
House Bill 3915 does, however, provide two exemptions from assignee
or securitizer liability. First, no party will be liable if it cures any defect in
2 29
the mortgage within ninety days of receiving notice from the borrower.
Second, assignees or securitizers will not be liable if they have a "policy"
against buying mortgages that are not qualified and have obtained
representations and warranties from the seller or assignor of the loan that
the party does not sell or assign loans that violate the minimum
standards. 23" These two exemptions make it possible for secondary market
actors to insulate themselves against liability by enacting internal policy
and procedure in line with the purposes of the House Bill 3915.231
Additionally, in a partial coup for the secondary market, the Act prohibits

224. See Willis, supra note 13, at 768.
225. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 204 (2007).
226. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 32, at 2041 (explaining that securitization harms
consumers in several ways, including insulating securitizers from liability).
227. See Peterson, supra note 11, at 2233.
228. H.R. 3915 § 204.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
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class actions against assignees or securitizers.232 Also note that investors
and pools of investors in securitization vehicles are excluded from liability
altogether.233 Hopefully, according to House Bill 3915 advocates, with
investors fully shielded from liability, the secondary market demand for
mortgage backed securities will remain high.234
The drafters of House Bill 3915 tried to "strike a very delicate balance
that provides consumer protections without unnecessarily limiting the
availability of loans to creditworthy borrowers.

2 35

The House Bill 3915

establishes "some legal liability for securitizers, but it also provides some
liability protection to those companies if they meet certain due diligence
requirements in reviewing the loans they are packaging., 236 Practically,
House Bill 3915 does away with the "holder in due course" doctrine as a
defense for secondary participants in the subprime market. 237 Exposed to
liability, securitizers and assignees who want to participate in the subprime
market will have no choice but to police loan sellers on their own.23 8
Violations of the House Bill 3915's minimum requirements would
generally be discernable on the face of the loan documents, so it would not
be overly difficult for the secondary market to enforce the minimum
standards on originators. 239 Alternatively, investment banks could also
place significant bonding requirements on the originating brokers and
lenders, so that they would have the resources to pay any penalty required
for violation of the Act's minimum standards.24 ° Investment firms will

232. Id.
233. H.R. 3915 § 204.
234. It remains to be seen if after this crisis there will be any significant market demand for
subprime mortgage backed securities at all. On the other hand, it may prove to be beneficial if
market demand drops. As the Economistargues, securitization of subprime loans increased market
demand such that brokers and lenders began extending credit without considering if it was prudent
to do so. Chain of Fools, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2008, at 84, available at http://economist.com/
finance/displaystory.cfm?story id= 10641119.
235. 153 CONG. REC. H13982 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Maloney).
236. Id.
237. "Eliminating the 'holder in due course' defense could ... lead to a significant reduction
in the fraud element of predatory loans .... Stark, supra note 71, at 147. Stark further comments
that other predatory loan features, including overpriced and unaffordable loans, will not be affected
unless fraud can be proven. Id.
238. Willis, supra note 13, at 828 ("As many others have also recognized, any regulation of
the home loan market must give the secondary market some skin in the game. The broker or lender
that originates the loan may disappear or lack the capital necessary to make the borrower whole
down the line."). With the holder in due course doctrine in place, there is no incentive for secondary
market actors to ensure that brokers and lenders are not predatory. See id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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decide whether any additional measures need to be taken as secondary
actor liability case law evolves.
Critics of the House Bill 3915 argue that assignee liability will surely
have a chilling effect on the market. 24 ' However, there is conflicting
evidence as to whether securitizers will continue to purchase residential
mortgages from originators if they face potential lawsuits.242 In the official
House Committee on Financial Services Report, opponents of the House
Bill 3915 worry that "the bill will understandably make ... assignees
highly skittish about making or buying loans other than traditional loans
' Moreover, assignee liability is going
to the most qualified customers."243
to end up hurting the consumers it seeks to protect by limiting their access
to credit: 2" "[t]he accommodation of subprime borrowers through flexible
underwriting will be sharply curtailed, to the detriment of many borrowers
who, experience has show, can and do repay their loans. 245
That being said, the cause of action is extremely limited in scope.
Investors, those who bear the ultimate risk in subprime transactions, are
still fully shielded from liability. 246 Therefore, the ultimate demand for
mortgage backed securities will continue to be driven by market forces and
not by any new liability. Furthermore, by prohibiting class action lawsuits,
House Bill 3915 drastically reduces assignees' potential liability.2 47 It is
unlikely that individual consumers will have the time, inclination, or
resources to aggressively pursue secondary actors beyond having their
loans rescinded. 24' Additionally, the safe harbors built into the House Bill

241. See id.However, the true effects of assignee liability on the marketplace may not be
determinable for years to come because, following this credit crisis, the demand for subprime MBS
has dropped precipitously as investment banks worry about future defaults and foreclosures.
242. Noting the subjectivity making secondary actors liable if loans do not meet the new
suitability provisions, a Wall Street Journalarticle predicts billboards that will read "Behind on
your mortgage? For relief, call 1-800-Sue-Your-Banker." A SarboxforHousing,WALL ST. J., Nov.
6, 2007, at Al 8, availableat http://www.opinion journal.com/editorial/id=l 10010826.
243. H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 108.
244. See 153 CONG. REC. H14019 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Hensarling)
("Again, we need to step back and decide, on this entire issue of assignee liability, when we look
at all the resets that are due to happen in the market, will this legislation add liquidity to the market?
Will it subtract liquidity from the market?").
245. H.R.REP.No. l10-441,at 108.
246. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 204 (2007).
247. Id.
248. "Discovery, negotiation, and litigation in general is more expensive for consumers with
securitized loans than it is for loans funded by the traditional secondary market." Peterson, supra
note 11, at 2263. Peterson argues that structured finance creates additional barriers against
consumers bringing lawsuits. Id.at 2264. Given the complexity of the typical subprime transaction,
this is not surprising.
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3915 may prove to be overly protective of secondary market participants.
As explained above, secondary market actors will be able to insulate
themselves by employing internal standards and by requiring brokers and
lenders to be more diligent in screening loan applicants.24 9 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, House Bill 3915 preempts all state assignee
liability law so that states will not be able to pass any stricter forms of
liability for securitizers and assignees.25 ° As such, investment firms will
only have to worry about accountability at the federal level, while
originators may be additionally regulated by the states.25 '
Regardless, creating a federal cause of action against secondary market
actors may be redundant and unnecessary. Courts in many states have
already begun to allow consumers to circumvent the holder in due course
defense by focusing on the technical criteria for establishing it.252 For
instance, "[i]n the subprime mortgage market, some businesses have been
less than perfect in correctly endorsing their notes, giving consumer
counsel the occasional open window to assert predatory lending claims
' Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial
against the current assignee."253
Code acknowledges abrogating the holder in due course defense where the
assignee was culpable in the originators unlawful behavior. 4 While the
definition of culpability varies from state to state, "[c]ourts generally agree
that the assignee lacks good faith where it has a close connection with the
originator, on the theory that the assignee is considered part of the initial
transaction. 25 5 This concept matches well with the typical subprime
lending transaction where the originator has established a business

249. See supra text accompanying note 238
250. H.R. § 208(a) ("[S]hall supersede any State law or application thereof that provides
additional remedies against any assignee, securitizer, or securitization vehicle, and the remedies
described in such section shall constitute the sole remedies against any assignee, securitizer, or
securitization vehicle .... "). However, it must be noted that state law actions for fraud,
misrepresentation, deception, false advertising, and civil rights are not preempted by this section.
Id. § 208(b)(2). With that being said, states are worried that H.R. 3915 may emasculate legislation
already on the books. Vicki Lee Parker, Lending Bill Could Pull the Teeth from N.C. Law, NEWS
&OBSERVER (RALEIGH, NC), Dec. 4,2007, at D I ("[North Carolina] Attorney General Roy Cooper
criticized the federal Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, saying it would
weaken the remedies North Carolina homeowners have available to fight lenders who break the
law.").
251. See H.R. 3915 § 208(b)(1). The House Bill 3915 explicitly states that "[n]o provision of
this section shall be construed as limiting the application of any state law against a creditor." Id.
252. Peterson, supra note 11, at 2235.
253. Id.at 2236.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2236-37. Peterson also notes that "[o]ther courts have found the potential for
assignee liability on a joint venture theory or an aiding and abetting theory." Id. at 2237.
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relationship with an investment bank to sell all rights to any loan it
extends.256 Without the investment bank's involvement, the originator
would not be able to lend to subprime borrowers in the first instance.
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, In re FirstAllianceMortgageCo. ,257
the circuit court upheld a judgment against a secondary market actor for
participating in a predatory lending scheme. 2 8 The Ninth Circuit held that
because Lehman Brothers, Inc. (the secondary market actor) had direct
knowledge of First Alliance's questionable business practices, Lehman was
liable for aiding and abetting a uniform and systemic fraud in violation of
California tort law and California's Unfair Competition Law. 2 9 The circuit
court found that the investment bank satisfied the lender's entire financing
need, making it possible for First Alliance to continue its predatory
practices even after other banks stopped doing business with it.260 Further,
Lehman continued its existing business relationship with First Alliance
even though the bank knew that First Alliance's financial difficulties
stemmed directly and indirectly from litigation regarding dubious lending
practices. 261
262
FirstAlliance was a watershed moment for secondary actor liability.
Though the Ninth Circuit did not overturn the holder in due course defense
and it upheld the conviction on aiding and abetting grounds, the effects of
this case have not yet been fully determined. It may indeed "open[] the
door to lawsuits against secondary market participants under both aiding
and abetting and civil conspiracy theories. ' ' 263
Peterson convincingly argued that evolving state common law claims,
like those in In re First Alliance, can provide appropriate avenues of
redress for aggrieved consumers without changing the current regulatory

256. See supra Part III.
257. 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
258. See id.; see also Fraud: Subprime Mortgages, 37 REAL EST. L. REP. 1 (2007)
(summarizing FirstAlliance).
259. FirstAlliance, 471 F.3d at 994-95.
260. Id. at 995.
261. Dan Schecter, Investment Bank is Liable for Aiding and Abetting Subprime Lender's
Fraudbut is Not LiableforPunitiveDamages,EquitableSubordination,andFraudulentTransfers,
2006 COM. FIN. NEWS. 93 (2006).
262. Andrew L. Sandier et al., The ExpansionofLiabilityfor PredatoryandDiscriminatory
Lending to Secondary MortgageMarketParticipants,1638 PLI/Corp. 819,821 (2007) (taking "the
unprecedented step of extending liability for fraud perpetrated by an originator to the secondary
market under an aiding and abetting theory").
263. Id.; but cf Stoneridge Inv.Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008)
(holding that investors in a company committing fraud did not have a cause of action against
corporations' vendors and customers as primary actors).
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scheme. 264 In particular, Peterson suggests that aiding and abetting liability,
liability may all be used to
civil co-conspirator liability and joint venture
2 65

bring assignees, and securitizers into court.

As currently written, the House Bill 3915's assignee liability provision
will probably have little real world effect. Because of its limited scope,
easy attainable safe harbor, federal law preemption provisions, and the
availability of common law claims already in place, assignee and
securitizer liability provision of House Bill 3915 will accomplish few of
its stated goals. Though at this point it is unclear whether there will be any
significant market chilling effects, it may prove to be the case that the
assignee liability provision of House Bill 3915 is more bark than bite.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the only thing as impressive as the subprime market's rapid
growth2 66 is the alacrity with which it crashed. Borrowers, brokers, lenders,
investment banks, and the ultimate investors themselves were caught in the
tidal wave of defaults caused by the precipitous drop in nationwide housing
prices and the coincidental rise in short-term interest rates.267 Once the
subprime market collapsed, the country opened its eyes to the deep flaws
in the housing market that it had casually overlooked during the boom
years.268 It became clear that the crisis was a direct and perhaps inevitable
result of the rise of securitization, the loosening of credit, and the excesses
of mortgage brokers and originators.269
But the real lesson of this crisis is how to prevent future housing
catastrophes. As certain as there is no one person or group to blame,27 ° no
single response will buoy the sinking housing market. House Bill 3915 is
the most significant piece of legislation drafted since the fall of the
subprime market. While it endeavors to learn from this crisis and prevent
similar crashes from recurring, House Bill 3915 is fundamentally flawed.
Yes, the Bill makes great strides to correct some severe flaws in the

264. Peterson, supra note 11, at 2282 ("While growing calls for assignee liability reform are
a positive development in the law, they must not be seen as a replacement for maturation in the
common law of imputed liability.").
265. Id. at 247-55.
266. Sabry & Schlopflocher, supra note 17, at 91.
267. Friedman & Wilson, supra note 2, at 420.
268. Dulce J. Foster, Pursuingthe Predators:Regulators Response to Mortgage Fraud,64
BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 19 (2007).
269. Ledbetter, supra note 17, at 39-43.
270. Foster, supra note 268 at 18.
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lending market, but bipartisanship"7 ' and typical congressional
shortsightedness make it inevitable that this new potential federal
legislation will soon prove to be as outdated as previous incarnations.
In my opinion, this legislation fails because it is simply insufficiently
proactive. To have any lasting impact, predatory lending statutes must be
sufficiently flexible to adapt as the dynamic housing market evolves over
time. To be fair, certain parts of House Bill 3915 will undoubtedly have a
positive effect on the transparency and efficiency of the market. I believe
that those aspects of the House Bill 3915 that avoid a rigid application of
current conceptions about predatory lending will have a lasting beneficial
impact on the American marketplace. From this Note's analysis, I can
group the provisions of House Bill 3915 into three classes based on
efficiency and lasting impact: those that will have a positive impact; those
that will have little impact at all; and those that will have a negative
impact.
Chief among the positive aspects of House Bill 3915 are the Agency
responsibilities. The OHC will be able to guide borrowers through the
lending process regardless of how the system realigns itself 72 If employed
effectively through the combination of a national campaign and grassroots
efforts, the OHC will protect against borrowers' behavioral and cognitive
biases, negating many unscrupulous broker tactics. 273 Furthermore,
participation in the OHC is mandatory, and counselors will be available to
assist borrowers at all steps in the process. 274 Along the same line, the
National Mortgage Licensing System and Registry will provide a
governing body for the mortgage lending industry, and hopefully prevent
dishonest brokers and lenders from ever meeting with borrowers.275
Similarly, the federal duty of care for mortgage originators and new
suitability provisions will force brokers and lenders to diligently screen
loan applications and work with the OHC to provide borrowers with home
mortgages they can repay and financings that truly benefit them. 76
While I recognize the need for secondary market actor liability in some
form, the assignee liability provisions written into the Bill will have little
real world influence. Investment banks do not worry about class action

271. For instance, the state law preemption for assignee liability was added to garner
Republican support. Nylen & Ives, supra note 85.
272. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007).
273. See supra Part IV.
274. H.R. 3915 § 403 (outlining counseling procedures).
275. Id. tit. I.
276. Supra Part V.
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suits.2 77 They can easily insulate themselves against liability with internal
company mechanisms and only a moderate amount of broker control." 8
Furthermore, following the recent In re FirstAlliance decision and the
maturation of other state common law claims, a limited federal cause of
action seems superfluous unless it goes above and beyond the available
state causes of action. However, House Bill 3915 has fallen short, and it
simply does not go above and beyond available state actions.27 9
Finally, one aspect of the assignee liability section will have clear
negative repercussions. Since it preempts state law assignee liability
provisions, states will be prevented from passing any additionally liability
provisions in the future.28 ° As the federal government takes far longer to
react than do states, this may turn out to be a serious problem if the
housing crisis continues. Another critique of House Bill 3915 is that it
outlaws many types of mortgage products and features, which will limit
credit availability for subprime borrowers during a time when borrowers
" ' Lastly, by increasing
with bad credit will be in most need of assistance.28
the required disclosures without adequately simplifying them, House Bill
3915, unfortunately, makes things more complicated for inexperience and
uneducated borrowers.282
Although credit rating agencies exert an incredible amount of influence
over subprime transactions, House Bill 3915 does not impose any
additional responsibilities on them. 283 By assessing the level of risk for
each mortgage backed security, credit rating agencies can either create or
destroy the market for a particular product. 284 Though these entities are
supposedly independent, they are driven by profit just like the rest of the
links in the subprime chain.285 It is now clear that they were not nearly as
diligent in rating subprime mortgage backed securities as they should have
been. 286 Any housing market legislation that does not address the credit
rating agencies is sorely lacking.

277. H.R. 3915 § 204.
278. Id.
279. Supra Part VI.
280. H.R. 3915 § 208.
281. Supra Part V.
282. Id.
283. See Peterson, supra note 11, at 2209-10.
284. Id.
285. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 17, at 96.
286. "Particularly at fault are the rating agencies-Moody's, for example-that were paid fees
to rate the investments and misled the institutional investors as to the quality of the mortgage
products they were rating." Mitchell, supra note 197 at B7.
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As of this writing, the end of the subprime crisis has not yet appeared
on the horizon. Bear Steams, one of the nation's preeminent investment
banks, sold itself to a competitor for a mere pittance, due in large part to
its subprime write-downs.287 Also, the Department of Justice has recently
begun an investigation of investment giant Merrill Lynch for its subprime
dealings.288 Unless the federal government relieves some of the pressure off
borrowers and investment banks, the market will undoubtedly sink into a
costly recession.289 Though House Bill 3915 takes some important steps
toward preventing future recurrences, not all of its arrows are pointed at the
right target. Unless Congress is willing to be reasonable and look at the
mortgage market as a historically dynamic institution, then the rigid
inflexible application of the Bill will only prevent many Americans from
realizing their dream of buying a home.

287. "On Sunday, Mr. Dimon [head of JPMorgan], weary-eyed after three days and nights of
frantic negotiations, stunned Wall Street with the news that JPMorgan would buy Bear Steams, the
troubled investment bank, for a fire-sale price of $2 a share." Eric Dash, Rallying the House of
Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at C.
288. Amir Efrati et al., ProsecutorsWiden Probesinto Subprime-US. Attorney's Office Seeks
MerrillMaterial;SEC Upgrades Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2008, at C1.
289. Sens. Schumer, Brown, and Casey propose an interesting solution: let CEOs help bail the
country out. See Letter from Sen. Charles E. Schumer et al., to CEOs in Mortgage Lending
Industry, 1633 PLI/Corp. 89 (2007).
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